The Discovery of "Lean"

Whoa! I've been out of the blog saddle for a while...been a busy winter.

Speaking of staying busy, Mark Warren has been at it as well. Take a few minutes out of your day to check out this great synopsis about the "Discovery of Lean" by Mark:

I really like the slide above. It best illustrates what is wrong with today's version of lean:

1) We are taught to create work cells because that is lean,
2) The work cells do not really synchronize well,
3) They are not synchronized because the work content is not not balanced,
4) The work is unstable because standards are weak or non-existent,
5) Standards are weak or non-existent because (insert your reason here)

If you follow the chain above in the opposite direction, it is easy to see that people who organize for flow by first creating work standards it is far easier to implement and improve work cell arrangements to be flexible with demand. And of course, Job Instruction is a great place to start with creating work standards.

It is between the parentheses above where leadership can make all of the difference. Managers end up inserting excuses, leaders find the reasons and eliminate them. That is called waste elimination.

Learning to see the waste can be hard, because we are so hyper focused on creating work cells. When the work cells do not work, we resort to old coercive speed up tactics, give up or go back to the old way.

So, I admit it. I'm a purist, the stuff today's Lean is made of is really just a collection of skills and principles applied and developed over 100 years ago. I really like Mark's YouTube video above because it speaks to the validity of principles in systems leadership. I'm curious what all of you think about Mark's story above? Does this resonate? In what way?

(Darn, it is hard to not use the word, "lean")

TWI - New Zealand Program Evolution & Toyota Discoveries

Digging a little deeper in the first sections of the New Zealand Appreciation, Operating and Follow-Up programs the past days...there are some interesting discoveries to discuss.

A little background may be in order: as stated in previous posts, the New Zealand TWI group honed their skills over 30 years - far longer than the TWI Institutes of World War II. They also had some pretty good exposure, er, influence over a heavy Lean hitter. Mark reported back to me that the New Zealand group, later called ITS, or Industrial Training Service, contracted with Toyota NZ operations to deliver TWI programs. This occurred over some 45 sessions during the early to mid 1980s. More roots to dig into! Here is an article link about the Toyota NZ TWI installation.

I digress. The point is, ITS had lots of experience, arguably far more experience than the WWII TWI team, especially when looking at their program development over the years. Here are a few things that were codified in their JI program:

First, Job Instruction training improves communication. My experience is that the JI skill is an excellent way of clearly communicating with people. What is interesting to me is that ITS states that their JI program aims to improve communication and training. This is the first time I’ve seen anyone claim that the aim of JI is to improve communication, especially over the training objective. Most trainers in the U.S. will claim better communication is an output, or result of training - not the primary aim. Perhaps the ITS team did not mean it that way, but judging from the 240 pages of materials in this book, I think they may have discovered something and shifted the focus on the JI program:

Form #103/1, from New Zealand ITS, TWI Appreciation, Organizing and Follow Up, ed. Mark Warren

This makes me wonder, why do I often hear from others that communication is a problem in companies? (data) I thought we had this one figured out? Obviously, not. So, we need to relearn how to communicate. There are many ways, TWI JI skills being one way. Are there patterns in the art of communication that we are missing that, if found and used, could make communication better? Is communication an art? Have we forgotten about the science behind communication, or are we all better served to leave the talking to those born with the gift? Would your team benefit if individuals could learn how to communicate better? Do you have any ideas about how JI skills could improve communication? What is your experience?

The second discovery is how ITS “sold” TWI programs to organizations. They called it “The “Problem Approach”. I think almost all companies today try to sell something to customers that they think they need. You don’t sell a car to somebody, you sell status. Or reliability. Or style. Or all of the above, but you aren’t selling them just a car. In the case of ITS, they used “The Problem Approach” to sell management on the proven results obtained by people using TWI skills. The ITS group really embraced the model setup during the war, which was never really codified as the war ended. ITS seems to have figured out that is how to get around some of the objections to installing what could be perceived as yet another training program.

Form #301 from New Zealand ITS, TWI Appreciation, Organizing and Follow Up, ed. Mark Warren.

What results have you realized using TWI skills? Do you feel they could be used to sell the continuing use of the program, or the spread of the program to other parts of the organization? What best practices could you share that help demonstrate benefits of TWI skills that go beyond training? Have you found that people communicate, cooperate and collaborate better when taking a different approach than what we have learned about TWI already?

Toyota Production System used to build homes faster and better.

Total Recall: The Toyota Story on CNBC

I've been a bit out of the blogger realm since end of May...family, the new job (seven months now) and life in general have pushed the blog/website priority to a late night affair.

One thing about this heat wave in Vermont, I was able to commission the TV tonight. I think my wife was too wiped out to even put up a fight for the controller! While surfing through the many, many channels that I pay for but don't watch - a Japanese factory worker caught my eye...

Behold! A 1 hr piece on CNBC - about Toyota. As I'm watching workers work and parts move through the Trim Door Kaizen Gate, I begin to hear less about the Toyota Production System, which the show does a typical cursory job of covering - and then I watch as the show transforms into some sort of hit piece on the Japanese company.

As the story continues to bash Toyota, presenting speculative versions of what happened in the Sudden Unintended Acceleration recall by lawyers, government officials, management "gurus" and otherwise hacks, we see lots of footage of factory work. There is even a short clip of some Job Instruction at an off-the-line tire installation station.

One thing the story probably got half right - and this is arguable since none of us REALLY know: Toyota probably caught a bad case of "big company" - where they decided to be bigger than GM, rather than focus on making good cars better. At least this is what one of the talking heads, Peter Brown claims.

In the end, and as most "news" shows go, there is no resolution. Only biased conclusions based on mostly speculation.

But don't take my word for it, you judge for yourself. I was hoping to see a technical story about the recall problem but apparently, genbutsu (facts?) are too much for the media to uncover.

CNBC airtimes: 
Wednesday, July 7th  8p | 12a ET
Sunday, July 25th  8p ET

Toyota Pedal Problems Not Solved

More Toyota drama...a Prius reached speeds of over 90mph on a California Highway. The driver tried to pull the floor mat away from the pedal. The floor mat he received a recall on, but claims he was turned away from the dealer. The driver's account of passing a car just before the pedal stuck in this AP story gives us a new clue as to what is happening..."it did something kind of funny... it jumped and it just stuck there."

Uh-oh. A defective friction pad, the original recall culprit, can't make the pedal move on its own can it? A professor claims he can replicate the speed increase by manipulating the electronics, but Toyota claims that they can replicate the same effect in other vehicles made by different manufacturers. I have to say though, a pedal that jumps away from your foot sounds like what it would feel like when the cruise control engages. Maybe there is more to the electronics problem than Toyota is letting on...

Politicians Jump Onto the Pig Pile

Well, here is real trouble for Toyota now. Looks like Toyota may have "misled" regulators in the handling of the recall. Hell hath no fury like a Democratic controlled Congress who is about to lose control of the House and Senate in 2010. Toyota, whether negligent or not, is easy pickings for a Congress that has done all but purchase the entire fleet of American made cars to buy off their constituents.

But, if Toyota intentionally misled regulators, then they will reap what they sow.

The Pig Pile Gets Bigger

Critics of the Toyota Production System have been quick to pile on the revolutionary management approach as part of the reason for the recall. This is faulty thinking. Here is why:

The pedal design problem, according to Toyota, is due to a design issue - possible corrosion related. Corrosion, like other engineering problems, is one of a predictive nature.

Back on February 3, I talked with my co-author of the Job Instruction Implementation Manual, Mark Warren, of Tesla2, Inc., about this problem. Mark has been called in to solve failure analysis problems for companies so he had some interesting insight on this matter. After reading my post on "The Pig Pile", Mark had this to say:

"Have any of the critics considered the number of miles on the vehicles in question or the age of the components or the locations of the failures? Given the initial stumble of attributing the failures to floor mats is indicative that they did not use their famous admonition of considering multiple solutions before choosing the final one."

So, at first glance, Mark seems to be falling onto the pig pile, blaming Toyota for not following their principles. Did they simply abandon the questioning method, focusing on the simple, low cost solution of fixing the floor mat? Or were they facing a more complex solution not easily solved by a quality circle or kaizen solution? Mark continues without going down path of the "see, I told you TPS was all wrong! crowd..."

"However, most field failures are rarely a ‘cut and dried’ affair, especially where tragedy has struck. No one likes to hear that human error was the cause or major contributor. While the news reports claim that there are thousands of complaints of sticking throttles, the first step is that we must realize that this is a symptom description. One that was given by a large number of different people. When you take a large number of failures with the same symptom description that are presented to a warranty department, they usually take the component and try to replicate the described failure. Typical results will have a distribution of some of the complaints matching the initial description. You will also have other failure modes that can possibly be described by the initial description, but fit a different failure mode better. Then you have the samples that function perfectly – to the original manufacturing specifications. Granted, some of the parts might exhibit intermittent behavior, but many just get pulled because the dealer is just trying to satisfy a customer that is concerned (the placebo effect). (General rule of thumb was only about half of the components submitted had ANY identifiable defects. People just replace parts until the symptoms go away.)"

This description of the data collection and analysis phase of problem solving feels about right, doesn't it? We can't replicate the problem, or other problems are discovered, or everything works just as expected. Question for the Pig Pilers: is this the "fault" of the Toyota Production System?

"Oops, I forgot to shoot down the people that think a Toyota employee has failed because they did not pull the andon cord on the assembly line. If this is a corrosion problem that caused the sticking of the throttle mechanism, this failure may take months or years to happen. This is no reflection on the Toyota line workers. In addition, most parts undergo a salt spray to test for corrosion. I find it unlikely that the initial design would be the problem. Most cases like this happen where minor changes are made to a component that has been used for years failure free and the contract manufacturer does not complete the lengthy reliability testing on the changes."

Again, the fault of Toyota Production System? Probably not...would we blame this problem on the Ford Production System if this was found with in the Focus, Fusion and Taurus? It seems to be that this problem has presented itself as a convenient way of allowing people to exhibit some good ole' fashion protectionism...but I digress...back to Mark:

"Now, back to the people point fingers…even when you might have a unit with corrosion, this does not mean that you can have the part stick every time you try it. With such a statistically low failure rate there are probably other factors as well that exist to create the situation. Multiple dependent failures are difficult to detect and to duplicate. Because of this the investigators often make misleading assumptions, mostly claiming that they have found THE cause. That is until more failures occur and they must go back and sift thru the data yet again.

"Probably what is going to found is the typical car part has had elevated exposure to moisture and temperature (accelerating the corrosion). That the part dimensions between the sticking components are not near the production means (less clearance than normal). That the return spring might also be corroded, leading to lower than normal C rate to return throttle to idle (or on the lower value if there is no corrosion). That the normal driving habit did not include pushing the throttle to the max position – if they regularly floored the throttle (aggressive drivers), corrosion would be worn away as it accumulated. However, a careful driver is more at risk than an aggressive one (unless they are not the normal driver) – with the random time that they move the throttle into a position that was not typical. Corrosion would have had time to build up to a point that the normal return controls would not be able to function.

I ask you to consider this point about the difficulty failure analysis presents given the wide demographic of consumers, driving conditions, environment, etc. I ask you to consider this because there is also a lot of criticism about the delay in Toyota's response to this problem affecting peoples lives. If Toyota recalled millions of vehicles three years ago and the failure revealed itself after the recall - what would the criticism be then? Hindsight is always 20/20 isn't it?

Mark suggests, "Now that you think that I have defended Toyota, I can take the other side. With all the advances in engine performance maps, I find it unusual that they do not have a safety routine to protect from accidental over-speed events. I’m sure that this sort of close inspection of what they should have done will trigger safety routines to be installed as a standard feature in future Toyotas as well as other brands."

Yes, the armchair quarterbacking of a multi-billion dollar, multi-national company does seem to be setting a certain direction, it seems that Mark's predictions are more or less correct, Toyota is taking a comprehensive approach to the safety problem. Blaming a production system scheme, however, is flat wrong.

The Pig Pile on Toyota

O.k., I didn't sleep well and this article annoyed me. So bear with me...the media machine is rumbling, stumbling and bumbling along...from Smartplanet, another clone article piles on lean manufacturing principles, or as they claim -lack there of, as the problem behind the gas pedal recall. They can say this at Smartplanet because they practice lean principles there and can project there lean experience over the Toyota company experience and pinpoint the problem in a 750 word article. They have knowledge.

Step up to the feeding trough and have some slops...

Is anybody going to do some insightful work on this story that doesn't blame:

-global business
-a management approach
-an organizational culture
-American employees for not being Japanese employees

Is anybody going to discuss sound principles that may have been overlooked, like testing, engineering, etc., things that have NOTHING to do with lean manufacturing? Or is the answer as simple as that claimed in this article: Japanese managers couldn't pass on their wisdom by "word of mouth?" Enough of the mystical Toyota bullshit, lets get down to the nuts and bolts of real problem solving - because while we are blathering on about management principles, Toyota stepped up and ate a whole pig trough of humble pie before the world and recalled over 9 million vehicles...do we seriously believe they aren't looking under every stone, but only focusing on their lean manufacturing philosophy?

NEW BOOK! TWI Job Instruction Training

What a great way to start the New Year! Or as Jon Miller likes to call it, an Arbitrary Dividing Line in Time :)

Regardless of the time of the year, it is always the right time to pick up a new skill. As of today Mark Warren of Tesla 2, Inc. and I have released our first book: Job Instruction Training: Participant's Sessions Guide & Implementation Manual

(Click on image to left for ordering information)

We are really excited about this, but what is this all about? The basic idea was this: there are a lot of people out there that are using Job Instruction and other TWI J-skills based on several premises:

1) We know it was used at Toyota after the war, (if it works for them, then we should do it)

2) many have mistakenly pigeonholed JI as Standard Work, (Toyota does Standard Work, so we should at least do this!)

3) and recently, many professionals have billed and marketed TWI as one of the foundation stones of lean.

but...TWI blog readers who have been through the archival material on my sites (and in the past year, have visited Mark's newly acquired archive records) intuitively know there is a lot more to know about TWI than what is currently available in a simple 10 hr training session.

This book is our attempt to fill that void of information between the famous 10 hr session and what might be considered a successful implementation. So, the book is divided into two parts. Part One is the Participant's Guide. Our guide follows the best known practices for a 10 hr Job Instruction Session. This would normally be unremarkable, except our book can be used as a self-study guide with the included answer key and references throughout Part One.

Part Two is in chapter format and expands on the concepts learned in the sessions, but also insists on the requirements for sound implementation. This is the first aim of the book - to provide the reader with the things you should know about Job Instruction before you start, but won't find out even in a 10 hr training session. The reason for this combination of guide, concepts and reference is born from experience and the research Mark and I have done over the past two years.

Who is this book aimed at? In keeping with the spirit of Job Instruction - one can learn by doing. So, anyone can use it. But trainers can use the standardized participants guide that will follow most reputable trainer's guides today. To this end, the book is sold in groups of ten to meet this training need, coupled with discounts of single volume sales to keep session costs down.

We also hope this book will succeed in providing a source for those individuals who are unable to attend a Job Instruction session for logistic, economic or other reasons. These thousands of small business owners and individuals who are limited to self study and implementation are at ease knowing they are practicing at the leading edge of JI training without the expense of travel to a 10 hr sessions. By using the included answer key and then digging into the meaty Part Two, one can dig deeper into the concepts of the J-skills in order to expand their leadership ability.

Ordering information for single volumes can be found by clicking here. Contact me with any questions at the email above! To expand on this, look for a trainer's manual between now and February!

Trainers: Order kits of 10 for your Job Instruction Session by clicking here!

Steven Spear article in Quality Magizine

Perhaps you have already seen it. But Jim Peck from the forum, JobShopLean linked the TWI blog up with the Steven Spear article titled, Innovation and Workforce Engagement in a High Velocity World, in the November 2009 edition of Quality Magazine talks about a different kind of workforce training and management's obligation to directly lead that effort.

There are some nuggets to take away from Spear's article. In today's fast paced world, even "Change is not enough." Spear goes on to explain, "Any one idea, even an insanely great one, will get a company only so far ahead and keep it there only so long.," therefore , "Competition today has to be a team sport with barely anyone riding the bench."

Sidenote: I'm not sure what the following means: "The result is that Toyota went into the downturn well in advance of its rivals, had a far bigger cushion and seems to be recovering quicker." So, does this mean that Toyota, because of the noticeably more sensitive (fragile?) systems it has intentionally put in place felt the effects of the economic downturn before its competition? This would be a very interesting hypothesis to explore further...any thoughts on this?

We can imply from the article that most management has failed in engaging the entire workforce in a meaningful way. At Aisin, a Toyota supplier, "Junior employees hired for front line work are first trained to do standard work with high fidelity," and then subsequently are "taught how to see problems that compromise safety, quality and time. This does not mean dropping a note in the suggestion box. It cannot be accomplished by the same management style that has already failed to accomplish it. A company's management has to change."

An anecdotal example from Pratt and Whitney follows, just so those that say it can only happen in Japan have a genba they can go and see in the United States.

And what do they need to see? That which requires change: managements ultimate obligation is that they must "improve their ability to keep improving."

A Perfect Lean Article in USAToday

The title link will take you to the full article...

Leansters always say to NEVER lay off people as a result of improvements. The article predictably dances around this dogma - you may be wanting a nice, clean and tidy explanation of why Lean should never lead to layoffs, but you won't find it here:

"In the short term, as manufacturers slash inventories and reduce their workforces, the recovery could be slowed or delayed, experts say. Many, such as Sealy, are scaling back through attrition and cutting temporary staff rather than resorting to layoffs.

Yet industry wide, some jobs will be lost permanently as manufacturers use their new cost efficiencies to wring more output from fewer employees, says Cliff Waldman, an economist at the Manufacturers Alliance, which does research for the industry. But by allowing U.S. manufacturers to better compete against low-cost rivals abroad, the maneuvers are helping them maintain profits and ultimately hire employees, economists say."

"It's survival," Waldman goes on to say, "Our response to the cost pressures brought about by globalization is … to produce cheaper and more efficiently."

And the magic metric responds accordingly:

"'manufacturing productivity, or output per labor hour, rose 4.9% in the second quarter, the highest since early 2005', traced to lean-manufacturing techniques."

So what is good for Wall St. (productivity) is not so good for Main St. (loss of jobs). This was probably one of the more favorable Lean articles, but like many before it, the message is conflicted...but shouldn't it be? I predict that you may see some critical reviews of this article on the lean blogging posts today...defender's of the lean principles telling all of us how the rest of the world doesn't understand lean.

We are all learning, so be careful about seeking the Perfect Cinderella Lean Story...that may signal the end of the journey. Toyota's story is full of conflict, contradictions and put simply - problems. Their story is far from perfect and yet it continues. So why should we expect something different for our situation?

What is Most Important - Online LinkindIN Poll by Toyota Manager

Update: 3/23/2013...sort of old news. However, it is interesting to see the results four years later after this poll was posted on LinkedIn by a Toyota manager.


__________________________________________________________________________
Old post:

Interesting poll over at LinkedIN. A Toyota Manager posted this simple question:

What is MOST important?

Product Development
Process Development
People Development
Results Focused

There are not too many responses yet, but perhaps you will be interested in the results. For example, about 30% of the respondents who said "Results Focused" was most important were executive or owner level. Mean anything to you? Want to see more results? Go to the hyperlink.

http://polls.linkedin.com/poll-results/53897/accyt

Lean IT - take two

Received a report about a broken link. This should work now...

Link will take you to a really thoughtful post about how TPS thinking can be applied to IT.

FPS - Fighter Production System

Lockheed says it will emulate the Toyota Production System because of its inherent advantages in "eliminating waste and integrating just-in-time logistics." This makes sense at many levels, given the ramp up details provided in this article at FlightGlobal.com

In fact, Lockheed's goal is to have "branded its own manufacturing style the 'Fighter Production System', to be emulated by other producers", within the next ten years.

This all sounds good, but once again, management-speak is taking over and unfortunately at our [taxpayers] expense. It seems two things are in play here:

1) Given the current tax-pillaging-climate we live in today, may I humbly suggest to our government and all contractors that we utilize said production system to focus on reducing cost and worrying about OUR money THEY are spending, not whether or not they can leverage OUR money to brand "their" production system - no doubt for consulting opportunities.

2) Is this the right goal: "emulating the Toyota Production System" so that the Lockheed system can be branded and emulated (i.e., sold)?? I wonder if a better goal should be along the lines of one fighter produced per day with zero defects, for example. Instead, this article reads like Lockheed has fallen for the old trap of managing to an ill-conceived end goal while hoping the solution will fix their actual problem.

Can JIT Slow Job Loss in a Recession?

In a world where bigger is better, the good times are good. When it gets rough though, look out! When the Big Three are closing entire plants for at least one month, we have to ask why not part of their plants, or, why not spread it out over time? I have to wonder if a big factor here is that concept isn't in their lexicon, let along their current capability. But all car makers have been hit by the same bearish economy - so, is the lack of JIT/mixed model and level loading philosophies in the Big Three a reason for “bigger” problems, such as entire plant closures? One has to wonder especially in the light of this news release:

Toyota Tells How and Where it Will Cut production

"This is a tough environment, and it may continue for a while. We are making responsible business decisions now in order to sustain our business over the long term," said Jim Wiseman, vice president of external affairs for Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America (TEMA). "In addition to slowing production we are redoubling efforts to cut costs at each of our facilities. Further actions and sacrifices may be necessary, but we will continue to do everything possible to assure the viability of our plants and protect the long term employment security of our team members."

Following this statement, we see in the article that the days to shutdown in each month from January through April are spread across many production lines and many different plants. It seems like Toyota is sticking to the philosophy of JIT in the recession and not abandoning it. A possible big benefit to JIT thinking here is that people are not without a job for at least a month. Thoughts on this? Does anyone know what the Big Three are doing aside from some of the plant closures we have seen in December and January? Is there a difference between the problems the Big Three face and what the Other Three (Toyota, Honda, Nissan) face?

I have to admit, there is a foreboding tone in the statement, "Further actions and sacrifices may be necessary," but my understanding is that Toyota will do everything it can to avoid layoffs, per its 1950-51 pledge. We will see as the events in coming months unfold.

"Buy-in" - What Are You Selling?

A reader emailed and asked how to avoid the "crickets" when pitching an idea to others. You know the feeling....you have the best idea and run it past your people. You know this idea is going to change the way things work, people are going to wonder why we haven't done it before!

Their response: silence, except for the crickets chirping away.

Especially frustrating for managers who need to get things done, getting buy-in from the people that work for you is extremely difficult, if not rare. We have to ask ourselves though, what are we doing when we try to get buy-in? What do we really want from people?

As a supervisor or manager, we usually want someone to think through the great idea you gave them and then go do it. Very rarely does this actually happen. If it does, invariably the idea isn't done the way you had envisioned it. It seemed like such a great idea yesterday morning, while you were in the shower, when you do your best thinking of how it would work just right!

So if we are looking for our people to buy-in to something, what are we selling? An idea. What are you seeking for payment? Usually commitment and action. What do our people get in return? Our idea, that we wanted them to do in the first place. Most people would rather have you just tell them to do it rather than go through the meetings to pitch the idea in the first place. That is so much more efficient!

But do we ever really get buy-in? Do subordinates or peers truly own our ideas once they have "bought-in"? The most likely answer is no.

What we really want is people to own ideas and put them into action. Supervisors that spend their time influencing and encouraging their employees to try out their own ideas as problems arise are far more successful than supervisors that try to sell their own ideas to their employees. This is a key component to successful kaizen teian or suggestion systems found in lean companies like Toyota, Subaru, Canon, Matsushita, Technicolor, Autoliv and many others.

Here We Go!! Let the Lean Madness Begin!

Toyota projects their first loss in 71 Years.

Now all of the ones that told us Leansters, "told-ya-so" can start thumbing their noses.

Toyota - Who's Going to Play with Me?

From CNN Money online: Why Toyota wants GM to be saved.

This article is fairly predictable, but gives you some idea that makes you wonder: has Toyota thought about the problem of not having competition? The whole DNA of the company is geared around looking for problems and then doing everything they can to not let those problems arise through preventative countermeasures. If GM is out of the picture - what problems will this pose?

Surely, a downturn in the economy is affecting them but with less effect due to their strategy to free up cash for the long haul. But with your biggest competitor gone? To start, capacity will be way off...the remaining competitors will either need to scramble to pick it up or hold off depending on economic conditions.

The U.S. market is the largest for the "Other Three", Toyota, Honda and Nissan. It stands to reason that they do not want the economy to slow down any further as well, which will undoubtedly happen if GM and Chrysler can't pick themselves up or get a bailout from us. I imagine the sensitivity of their systems will be amplified and large changes will need to occur within the "Other Three". I can imagine some further capacity shifts, similar to moving the Tundra capacity and filling it with Prius production earlier this year. Any other ideas out there?

Toyota Production System on Fox News

Newt Gingrich weighs in with a comment on TPS:

http://www.foxnews.com/video-search/m/21595953/big_three_plea.htm?pageid=23039

IW Webcast - Toyota Talent - Job Instruction

Scheduled for December 18, 2008 with author David Meier. This book is jammed full with Job Instruction!

Sign up for the webcast following the link: http://www.industryweek.com/EventDetail.aspx?EventID=628

Read up on the topic before Dec 18...Amazon has some great deals on this must read book!